Trivy v0.69.4 became a credential stealer after an attacker used stolen credentials to publish it on 19 March 2026.
The same attacker moved 76 of 77 version tags in aquasecurity/trivy-action and all 7 tags in aquasecurity/setup-trivy to malicious commits. The GitHub advisory is GHSA-69fq-xp46-6x23 with CVE-2026-33634.
What happened
A group that calls itself TeamPCP pushed credential-stealing code into three Trivy distribution channels at once.
- The malicious code ran in addition to the real scan, so workflows looked successful.
- On a GitHub-hosted runner, it dumped the memory of
Runner.Workerand searched it for secrets. - On other systems, it searched files for SSH keys, cloud credentials, Kubernetes tokens, Docker configuration and cryptocurrency wallets.
- It encrypted the data and sent it to
scan.aquasecurtiy.org. If that failed, it stored the data in a public repository namedtpcp-docsin the victim's GitHub account. - On developer machines, it left a Python dropper at
~/.config/systemd/user/sysmon.py.
Malicious commits went to trivy-action and setup-trivy at about 17:43 UTC on 19 March 2026. Trivy v0.69.4 became public at 18:22 UTC.
Affected versions
- Trivy binary and container image: v0.69.4, v0.69.5 and v0.69.6 are compromised. v0.69.2 and v0.69.3 are safe.
aquasecurity/trivy-action: all tags before 0.35.0 are compromised. v0.35.0 is safe.aquasecurity/setup-trivy: all versions not pinned by SHA are compromised. v0.2.6 is safe.- The bad files can persist in mirrors and build caches.
Indicators of compromise
- Exfiltration domain:
scan.aquasecurtiy.org, IP45.148.10.212. - Payload channel on the Internet Computer:
tdtqy-oyaaa-aaaae-af2dq-cai.raw.icp0.io. - Tunnel host:
plug-tab-protective-relay.trycloudflare.com. - GitHub repositories named with the prefix
tpcp-docs, with release assets taggeddata-<timestamp>. - Dropper file:
~/.config/systemd/user/sysmon.py. - SHA-256 of the Linux 64-bit tarball of v0.69.4:
385d498d18a3a7c67878ca7322716f9da25683eb1a4bf9e9592da0d5f2ab09f6. - Workflow runs on 19 and 20 March 2026 that used
trivy-actionorsetup-trivyby tag.
How to check
Search the workflow files for the actions and your organization for the fallback repositories. Replace YOUR-ORG with your organization name. A match on tpcp-docs means the malware ran. A tag reference other than @v0.35.0 is at risk.
grep -rn "aquasecurity/trivy-action\|aquasecurity/setup-trivy" .github/workflows/ gh repo list YOUR-ORG --limit 1000 --json name -q '.[].name' | grep tpcp-docs
Check install records, image digests, and CI logs for the Trivy versions used on build servers and developer machines.
What to do now
- Use only the safe versions above. Pin actions to full commit SHAs, because a tag can move.
- If a run used a bad version on 19 or 20 March 2026, rotate every secret that run held. Include GitHub tokens, cloud keys, registry credentials, SSH keys and database passwords.
- Check self-hosted runners and developer machines for
~/.config/systemd/user/sysmon.py. Search network logs forscan.aquasecurtiy.org. - Check container images and caches for v0.69.4, v0.69.5 and v0.69.6.
Frequently asked questions
What is the Trivy vulnerability?
CVE-2026-33634 is a critical (CVSS 9.4) supply chain compromise of March 2026. It is not a bug in how Trivy scans.
Is Trivy still compromised?
No. Aqua Security removed the malicious components and clean versions exist. Any workflow that ran a bad version must still rotate its secrets.
Who was behind the Trivy attack?
TeamPCP. The same group is linked to the later LiteLLM PyPI compromise and the Checkmarx KICS compromise.
Sources
- github.com/aquasecurity/trivy/security/advisories/GHSA-69fq-xp46-6x23
- github.com/advisories/GHSA-69fq-xp46-6x23
- wiz.io/blog/trivy-compromised-teampcp-supply-chain-attack
- snyk.io/articles/trivy-github-actions-supply-chain-compromise/
- microsoft.com/en-us/security/blog/2026/03/24/detecting-investigating-defending-against-trivy-supply-chain-compromise/
- snyk.io/blog/poisoned-security-scanner-backdooring-litellm/
- endorlabs.com/learn/teampcp-isnt-done
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