Every tag through v45.0.7 of the tj-actions/changed-files GitHub Action was repointed to a malicious commit on 14 March 2025.
The fix is v46.0.1 and the CVE is CVE-2025-30066. The GitHub advisory counts over 23,000 repositories that used the action.
What happened
An attacker stole a token for the action's bot account, added a malicious commit and moved the release tags to it.
- The attacker compromised a personal access token for
@tj-actions-botand moved all release tags to commit0e58ed8671d6b60d0890c21b07f8835ace038e67. - The commit ran a Python script that downloaded a memory-dump script from a GitHub gist.
- The script read the memory of the Actions Runner process through
/proc/{pid}/mem. - It printed the secrets, Base64-encoded, into the workflow log. In public repositories, anyone can read the log.
- Unit 42 says the attacker first leaked a SpotBugs maintainer token and then reached the reviewdog action setup.
The incident started at about 16:00 UTC on 14 March 2025. GitHub removed the action on 15 March at about 14:00 UTC.
Affected versions
tj-actions/changed-filesthrough v45.0.7, according to the GitHub advisory. The vulnerable tags include v1.0.0, v35.7.7-sec and v44.5.1.- Patched in v46.0.1.
- The window ran on 14 and 15 March 2025. Review workflows that ran in that window and used a tag, not a commit SHA.
Indicators of compromise
- Malicious commit:
0e58ed8671d6b60d0890c21b07f8835ace038e67. - Outbound request to
gist.githubusercontent.com, for the filememdump.py. - A long Base64-encoded block in a workflow log, printed by the changed-files step.
How to check
Find every workflow that uses the action and see how it is pinned. A tag such as @v44 was exposed. A full commit SHA from before the attack was not.
grep -rn "tj-actions/changed-files" .github/workflows
What to do now
- Remove the action or update to v46.0.1. StepSecurity also offers a drop-in fork,
step-security/changed-files@v45. - Review the logs of runs from 14 and 15 March 2025. Delete or restrict logs that show secrets.
- Rotate every secret that those workflows can read, such as cloud keys, tokens and SSH keys.
- Pin actions to a full commit SHA, not to a tag.
Frequently asked questions
How do I know if my workflows leaked secrets?
Check the logs of runs on 14 and 15 March 2025 for a large Base64 block in the changed-files step. Treat all secrets that the workflow can read as exposed.
Which repository was the first target?
Unit 42 states that the Coinbase agentkit repository was the first target of the code.
Sources
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