crates.io

The onering Rust Crate Supply Chain Attack

Updated 5 Oct 2026 · Incident date 10 Jun 2026

onering 1.4.1 on crates.io ran a build.rs script that sent the diff of the developer's latest git changes away, found on 10 June 2026.

onering is a high-throughput synchronous queue and channels library. It had over 18,000 downloads on crates.io when Aikido reported the problem.

What happened

Version 1.4.1 added a build script that steals source code from the project that uses it. Cargo runs build.rs files during compilation.

  • The script found the project root. It started at the Cargo OUT_DIR folder and moved up until it found the target folder.
  • It ran git commands to read the hash, author name, author email, date and subject of the last commit.
  • It ran git diff HEAD^ HEAD to read the full text of the last change.
  • It sent the data with an HTTP POST that looked like a Sentry telemetry event.
  • Aikido and GBHackers report that the maintainer's repository cenotelie/onering also appeared to be compromised.

Researchers found the problem on 10 June 2026. The sources do not say how the attacker gained access.

Affected versions

  • onering 1.4.1 on crates.io.
  • The git repository at cenotelie/onering, which the reports describe as also compromised.
  • The sources do not name the last clean version. Check the release list on crates.io.

Indicators of compromise

  • Endpoint: https://o4511539639222272.ingest.de.sentry.io/api/4511539669368912/envelope/
  • Sentry public key (DSN): 8197ee42c4f59c83f4cc6d48f5bae821
  • Sentry organization ID: o4511539639222272
  • Sentry project ID: 4511539669368912
  • Request type: HTTP POST with content type application/x-sentry-envelope and a diff in extra.patch.

How to check

Search your lockfile for the crate. If the line below it reads version = "1.4.1", your project built with the bad release.

grep -rn -A1 "name = \"onering\"" --include=Cargo.lock .

Search proxy and CI logs for the Sentry organization ID.

grep -rn "o4511539639222272" /var/log 2>/dev/null

What to do now

  1. Remove onering 1.4.1 or pin a version that you trusted before it. Regenerate Cargo.lock.
  2. List the commits that your project built while 1.4.1 was in the tree. Treat the diff of the last commit of each build as exposed.
  3. Rotate any secret that appeared in those diffs.
  4. Do not pull onering from the compromised repository. Check the git source in your manifest.

Frequently asked questions

What did the onering 1.4.1 crate steal?

It took the commit metadata and the full text diff of the latest git commit, and sent both to a Sentry ingest endpoint.

What can a last-commit diff hold?

New private code, security fixes that are not public yet, and secrets that a developer committed by mistake.

Sources

  1. aikido.dev/blog/compromised-rust-crate-onering-performs-code-exfiltration
  2. gbhackers.com/compromised-rust-crate-with-18000-downloads-steals-source-code/

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