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The arrayref, internment and append-only-vec Supply Chain Attack

Updated 5 Oct 2026 · Incident date 20 Aug 2026

arrayref 0.3.10, internment 0.8.7 and append-only-vec 0.1.9 on crates.io added a dependency that downloaded and ran a program on 20 August 2026.

Each release added a dependency named proc-macro1. That crate downloaded and ran a program from a remote server when the project compiled.

What happened

Attackers took over publishing for three popular Rust crates and released one new version of each.

  • The new versions added a dependency on proc-macro1, which imitates the real proc-macro2 crate.
  • Its build.rs file runs during compilation, with no import in your source.
  • The script rebuilds a server address from Base64 fragments and turns off TLS certificate checks.
  • It downloads a payload for the operating system and runs it.
  • The second stage lists Chromium browser logins, sets up persistence and waits for remote commands.

The releases went up within minutes of each other at about 07:29 UTC on 20 August 2026.

Affected versions

  • arrayref 0.3.10. Last clean version: 0.3.9.
  • internment 0.8.7. Last clean version: 0.8.6.
  • append-only-vec 0.1.9. Last clean version: 0.1.8.
  • proc-macro1 1.0.107, the malicious dependency. The attackers deleted it from the registry.
  • Other attacker crates in the reports: proc-macro-en, aovine, arone, aronenao and tinymember. JFrog reports that the last four carried no remote payload.

Indicators of compromise

  • Payload host: 23.254.165.112:9089. Command servers: 23.254.165.112:443 and 23.254.167.107:443.
  • Download paths: /rust-crate_0.1.0 (Linux x86-64), /rust-crate_0.2.0 (Windows), /rust-crate_0.3.0 (macOS x86-64), /rust-crate_0.4.0 (macOS ARM64).
  • Beacon path: /49890878.
  • Files: /tmp/rust-setup, %TEMP%\rust-setup.ps1, %TEMP%\rust-setup-launch.vbs.
  • Persistence: HKCU Run key (Windows), systemd user service (Linux), LaunchAgent (macOS).
  • SHA-256 of arrayref-0.3.10.crate: 25ad700976873c76af785cb99b33c48db7df8b81f21d1e9e06b3676b9a9373ae.
  • SHA-256 of proc-macro1-1.0.107.crate: 61198155da51b838772eecf5bfaac6cbc4dcc388dccc56658fc28a8e831b34d4.

How to check

Search every Cargo.lock for the bad versions and the malicious crate names.

grep -rnE "proc-macro1|proc-macro-en|name = \"(arrayref|internment|append-only-vec)\"" --include=Cargo.lock . -A1

On Linux or macOS, look for the payload.

ls -l /tmp/rust-setup

What to do now

  1. Pin arrayref 0.3.9, internment 0.8.6 and append-only-vec 0.1.8. Remove any proc-macro1 entry and regenerate Cargo.lock.
  2. If a bad version compiled on a machine, treat the host as compromised.
  3. Rotate every credential the build environment can read. Reset passwords stored in browsers.
  4. Delete the payload files and persistence entries above. Block the IP addresses above.

Frequently asked questions

How widely used is arrayref?

JFrog reports about 245 million downloads for arrayref alone.

How did the attackers get publishing access?

The Rust Security Response Team determined that the maintainer's machine or credentials were compromised, as reported by Wiz.

Who is behind the attack?

Wiz reports substantial overlap with North Korean campaigns, such as the same /49890878 beacon path used in an earlier campaign.

Sources

  1. research.jfrog.com/post/arrayref-proc-macro1-crates-io/
  2. socket.dev/blog/popular-rust-crates-compromised
  3. wiz.io/blog/rust-supply-chain-attack-on-arrayref-significant-overlap-with-dprk-campaigns

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