source tarball

The UnrealIRCd 3.2.8.1 Tarball Backdoor

Updated 5 Oct 2026 · Incident date 1 Nov 2009

The UnrealIRCd 3.2.8.1 source tarball held a backdoor that let anyone run commands on the server, replaced around 10 November 2009.

Attackers replaced the tarball Unreal3.2.8.1.tar.gz around 10 November 2009. The project found it on 12 June 2010, and Rapid7 lists the issue as CVE-2010-2075.

What happened

Attackers broke into the official UnrealIRCd site and FTP mirrors and swapped the 3.2.8.1 tarball for a trojaned one.

  • The backdoor was a disguised debug macro in include/struct.h.
  • A command that starts with the letters AB went straight to system().
  • Commands ran with the rights of the user that ran the server.
  • Access restrictions on the IRC server did not stop it.
  • The code is in the core, so removing a module does not help.

The swap dates to about 10 November 2009. The project announced it on 12 June 2010, so the backdoor stayed in place for about seven months.

Affected versions

  • Affected: Unreal3.2.8.1.tar.gz downloaded after 10 November 2009.
  • Not affected: the Windows builds, CVS, and version 3.2.8 and earlier.

Indicators of compromise

  • MD5 of the backdoored tarball: 752e46f2d873c1679fa99de3f52a274d.
  • MD5 of the official tarball: 7b741e94e867c0a7370553fd01506c66.
  • The string DEBUG3_DOLOG_SYSTEM in include/struct.h. A trojaned copy returns two lines. A clean copy returns none.
  • Official Windows installers, for comparison: Unreal3.2.8.1.exe 5a6941385cd04f19d9f4241e5c912d18 and Unreal3.2.8.1-SSL.exe a54eafa6861b6219f4f28451450cdbd3.

How to check

Hash the tarball. A hash of 752e46f2... means the bad tarball.

md5sum Unreal3.2.8.1.tar.gz

Run this in the source folder. Two lines of output mean the source is trojaned.

grep DEBUG3_DOLOG_SYSTEM include/struct.h

What to do now

  1. Stop any UnrealIRCd server built from a 3.2.8.1 tarball downloaded after 10 November 2009.
  2. Download the source again from the official site and check the MD5 sum against 7b741e94e867c0a7370553fd01506c66.
  3. Recompile and restart. Removing a module is not enough.
  4. Treat the host as compromised, because attackers can run any command. Check it for changes and rotate credentials stored on it.

Frequently asked questions

Did the backdoor reach Linux distributions?

LWN reports that the code entered the Gentoo distribution.

Did the project change how it ships releases?

The project started to sign releases with GPG after this incident.

Sources

  1. seclists.org/fulldisclosure/2010/Jun/277
  2. lwn.net/Articles/392201/
  3. rapid7.com/db/modules/exploit/unix/irc/unreal_ircd_3281_backdoor/

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