vendor binary

The Transmission for Mac OSX/Keydnap Attack

Updated 5 Oct 2026 · Incident date 29 Aug 2016

Transmission2.92.dmg from the official Transmission website carried the OSX/Keydnap malware on 29 August 2016.

The malware steals the macOS keychain contents and sets up a persistent backdoor. The app bundle was signed on 28 August 2016.

What happened

ESET reports that attackers compromised the BitTorrent client Transmission on its official website.

  • They added a block of malicious code to the main function of the application.
  • The file License.rtf inside the app is an executable, not a document.
  • ESET identifies the malware as Keydnap version 1.5.
  • It steals the contents of the OS X keychain and keeps remote access.
  • It talks to a Tor hidden service at an .onion address by HTTP POST with RC4 encryption.

The disk image went out on 29 August 2016.

Affected versions

  • Malicious: Transmission2.92.dmg (no hyphen), a recompiled build of version 2.92.
  • Genuine: Transmission-2.92.dmg (with a hyphen). This is the clean baseline.

Indicators of compromise

  • Transmission2.92.dmg SHA-1: 1ce125d76f77485636ecea330acb038701ccc4ce.
  • Dropper SHA-1: e0ef6a5216748737f5a3c8d08bbdf204d039559e.
  • Backdoor SHA-1: 8ca03122ee73d3e522221832872b9ed0c9869ac4.
  • ~/Library/Application Support/com.apple.iCloud.sync.daemon/.
  • ~/Library/LaunchAgents/com.apple.iCloud.sync.daemon.plist.
  • ~/Library/LaunchAgents/com.geticloud.icloud.photo.plist.
  • Processes named icloudproc, License.rtf and icloudsyncd.

How to check

Look for the persistence files that ESET names.

ls -d ~/Library/Application\ Support/com.apple.iCloud.sync.daemon ~/Library/LaunchAgents/com.apple.iCloud.sync.daemon.plist ~/Library/LaunchAgents/com.geticloud.icloud.photo.plist 2>/dev/null

Then check for the running processes.

pgrep -fl "icloudproc|icloudsyncd|License.rtf"

If you still have the disk image, hash it with shasum Transmission2.92.dmg and compare the value with the one above.

What to do now

  1. Quit Transmission and stop the processes icloudproc, License.rtf and icloudsyncd.
  2. Delete the files and folders listed above.
  3. Reinstall Transmission from a verified source and check its signature.
  4. Treat the keychain as stolen. Change the passwords stored in it.

Frequently asked questions

How does this attack compare with KeRanger?

ESET compares the method to the earlier KeRanger attack.

What is new in Keydnap 1.5?

It added a standalone Tor client and the ability to receive an updated command address.

Sources

  1. welivesecurity.com/2016/08/30/osxkeydnap-spreads-via-signed-transmission-application/

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