The second Shai-Hulud wave backdoored 796 unique npm packages across 1,092 versions, including @asyncapi/cli and posthog-node, on 24 November 2025.
The packages include @asyncapi/cli, posthog-node and zapier-platform-core. The payload ran at install time, before any of your code.
What happened
A worm took over maintainer accounts and pushed poisoned versions of their packages.
- Each package got
setup_bun.js,bun_environment.jsand apreinstallscript. - The payload installed the Bun runtime and searched for secrets with TruffleHog,
.npmrcand cloud secret stores. - It uploaded the secrets to public GitHub repositories described as "Sha1-Hulud: The Second Coming."
- It registered the machine as a self-hosted GitHub Actions runner.
- It used stolen npm credentials to backdoor up to 100 more packages.
Datadog traces the first victim to the asyncapi/cli GitHub repository. It counts more than 500 GitHub users and more than 150 organizations hit.
Affected versions
- Datadog counts 796 unique packages and 1,092 versions, with more than 20 million weekly downloads.
- Unit 42 and Microsoft also name Zapier, PostHog, Postman, ENS Domains and AsyncAPI projects.
- The sources give no single short list. Compare
package-lock.jsonagainst a feed of known malicious versions.
Indicators of compromise
- Files in a package:
setup_bun.jsandbun_environment.js, with apreinstallscript inpackage.json. - GitHub repository description: "Sha1-Hulud: The Second Coming." Repository names use 18 random lowercase letters and digits.
- GitHub workflow named "Discussion Create" (
discussion.yaml) and a runner agent namedSHA1HULUD. - SHA-256 of
setup_bun.js:a3894003ad1d293ba96d77881ccd2071446dc3f65f434669b49b3da92421901a. - Other hashes (Unit 42):
62ee164b9b306250c1172583f138c9614139264f889fa99614903c12755468d0,f099c5d9ec417d4445a0328ac0ada9cde79fc37410914103ae9c609cbc0ee068,cbb9bc5a8496243e02f3cc080efbe3e4a1430ba0671f2e43a202bf45b05479cd. - Webhook (Unit 42):
webhook[.]site/bb8ca5f6-4175-45d2-b042-fc9ebb8170b7. - Microsoft Defender alert names: "Sha1-Hulud Campaign Detected" and Trojan:JS/ShaiWorm.
How to check
Search installed packages for the two payload files.
find . -path "*/node_modules/*" \( -name setup_bun.js -o -name bun_environment.js \) -print
Search your GitHub account for the repository description.
gh search repos "Sha1-Hulud: The Second Coming" --owner YOUR_ORG_OR_USER
What to do now
- Rotate npm tokens, GitHub tokens, SSH keys and cloud credentials that any affected machine can read.
- Delete unknown repositories that match the description. Delete unknown workflows and self-hosted runners.
- Isolate CI agents that installed a bad version. Rebuild them.
- Pin dependencies and review any new install script before you update.
What Vigilance would show
These examples show an install hold and the corresponding owner report.
Example install message
Vigilance blocked `@asyncapi/cli`. This version is too new or changed in a way Vigilance must check first.
Example owner report
Bad update
@asyncapi/cli
The package can now download a second program before installing, gather the machine's cloud passwords, and infect more packages automatically.
No security team? See who reads the alert.
Frequently asked questions
Which npm packages were affected?
Datadog counts 796 unique packages and 1,092 versions. Examples are @asyncapi/cli, posthog-node and zapier-platform-core.
How does it steal credentials?
A preinstall script runs setup_bun.js and bun_environment.js. They search for secrets and upload them to public GitHub repositories.
Sources
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