The ProFTPD 1.3.3c source tarball held a backdoor that gave an unauthenticated remote user a root shell from 28 November to 2 December 2010.
The tracking ids are CVE-2010-20103 and GHSA-xm7r-423x-5463. The poisoned archive was the official download for about five days.
What happened
Someone added a hidden FTP command to the ProFTPD download archive.
- The change sits in
src/help.c. - The hidden command
HELP ACIDBITCHEZmakes the code change to root and start/bin/sh. - It needs no authentication and works over the network.
- The tarball also changed
configureand addedtests/tests.c.
The GitHub advisory gives a CVSS v4 score of 9.3. The archive carried the backdoor from 28 November to 2 December 2010.
Affected versions
- The 1.3.3c source tarball downloaded from 28 November to 2 December 2010.
- Not affected: a 1.3.3c installed from a distribution package that did not use the poisoned archive.
- A server built from the tarball in that window has the backdoor.
Indicators of compromise
- A ProFTPD 1.3.3c server built from a tarball downloaded between 28 November and 2 December 2010.
- A
proftpdprocess that starts a shell. - Unexpected root shells that start from the FTP service.
How to check
Check installation records for version 1.3.3c. If you built it from source, check the archive date and download origin.
Search the source tree you used to build, not a live server. A clean help.c has no shell call.
grep -n "/bin/sh" src/help.c
What to do now
- Stop the ProFTPD service if the source came from the bad archive.
- Rebuild from a clean tarball of a later release.
- Treat the server as compromised and review it from the start.
- Rotate credentials and keys on that server.
Frequently asked questions
Which ProFTPD version had the backdoor?
The 1.3.3c source tarball, served from 28 November to 2 December 2010.
How do I check my ProFTPD?
Run proftpd -v. If it reports 1.3.3c, check when you downloaded the source.
Sources
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