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The Operation SignSight VGCA Supply Chain Attack

Updated 5 Oct 2026 · Incident date 23 Jul 2020

The Vietnam Government Certification Authority website served two modified installers that installed the PhantomNet backdoor from 23 July to 16 August 2020.

ESET named the operation SignSight and published its findings on 17 December 2020. Most victims were in Vietnam, with a few in the Philippines.

What happened

Attackers hacked ca.gov.vn and replaced two installers with versions that held a backdoor.

  • The modified installer ran the real installer and dropped PhantomNet, also called SManager.
  • The dropper wrote it to C:\Program Files\VGCA\Authentication\SAC\x32\eToken.exe.
  • With administrator rights, a component went to C:\Windows\apppatch\netapi32.dll. Otherwise it went to %TEMP%\Wmedia\<number>.tmp.
  • PhantomNet talks to its servers over HTTPS and includes Mimikatz.

The sources do not say how the attackers entered the site. ESET notes that the clean installers are also signed incorrectly, so a signature check is not enough.

Affected versions

  • gca01-client-v2-x32-8.3.msi and gca01-client-v2-x64-8.3.msi from ca.gov.vn, 23 July to 16 August 2020.
  • The sources name no other installers or versions.

Indicators of compromise

  • Command servers: vgca.homeunix[.]org and office365.blogdns[.]com.
  • SHA-1 of the x64 installer: 5C77A18880CF58DF9FBA102DD8267C3F369DF449.
  • SHA-1 of the x32 installer: B0E4E9BB6EF8AA7A9FCB9C9E571D8162B1B2443A.
  • SHA-1 of the dropper: 9522F369AC109B03E6C16511D49D1C5B42E12A44.
  • SHA-1 of PhantomNet.B: 989334094EC5BA8E0E8F2238CDF34D5C57C283F2.
  • SHA-1 of the PhantomNet.A plugin: 5DFC07BB6034B4FDA217D96441FB86F5D43B6C62.
  • Paths: C:\Windows\apppatch\netapi32.dll, %TEMP%\Wmedia\*.tmp and C:\Program Files\VGCA\Authentication\SAC\x32\eToken.exe.

How to check

Hash the installer you kept and look for the dropped files.

Get-FileHash -Algorithm SHA1 .\gca01-client-v2-x64-8.3.msi; Test-Path C:\Windows\apppatch\netapi32.dll; Get-ChildItem $env:TEMP\Wmedia -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue

Use the x32 file name if you kept that installer. Compare the hash with the list above. Search DNS and proxy logs for the two command domains.

What to do now

  1. Find out who downloaded the two installers between 23 July and 16 August 2020.
  2. If a machine ran one, isolate and reinstall it. Treat its credentials as stolen.
  3. Reset domain and local passwords used on that machine. Review Active Directory.
  4. Block the two command domains.

Frequently asked questions

Which installers were compromised in Operation SignSight?

Two installers: gca01-client-v2-x32-8.3.msi and gca01-client-v2-x64-8.3.msi.

What is PhantomNet?

A backdoor that collects system information and loads plugins. ESET found it in the modified installers.

Sources

  1. welivesecurity.com/2020/12/17/operation-signsight-supply-chain-attack-southeast-asia/
  2. thehackernews.com/2020/12/software-supply-chain-attack-hits.html

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