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The Notepad++ Update Supply Chain Attack

Updated 5 Oct 2026 · Incident date 1 Jun 2025

Attackers hijacked Notepad++ update traffic and delivered trojanized updates through the WinGUp updater, affecting versions 8.8.2 through 8.8.9, in 2025.

The attackers took over the route between the updater and the update server, not the installer files. The fixed version is 8.9.1.

What happened

Attackers redirected requests from the Notepad++ updater to servers that they controlled.

  • Unit 42 reports that the group compromised the shared hosting behind the update server. Older WinGUp versions did not check the installer signature.
  • During a bad update, GUP.exe started AutoUpdater.exe. It collected network connections, host details, running processes and users.
  • It wrote them to a.txt and sent the file with curl.exe to temp[.]sh.
  • One payload was a Cobalt Strike Beacon, delivered with a malicious Lua script inside an NSIS installer.
  • The other was the Chrysalis backdoor, loaded by DLL side-loading from BluetoothService.exe with a malicious log.dll.

ThreatLocker reports that the compromise ran from June 2025 to 2 December 2025 and was disclosed on 2 February 2026. Unit 42 attributes it to Lotus Blossom, a state-sponsored group.

Affected versions

  • Notepad++ 8.8.2 through 8.8.9, updated with WinGUp (ThreatLocker).
  • Unit 42 states that versions before 8.8.9 lacked the certificate and signature checks. It names 8.9.1 as the safe update.
  • Fixed in 8.9.1.
  • The attack hit only machines that the attackers chose.

Indicators of compromise

  • Process: GUP.exe starting AutoUpdater.exe, often from a temporary folder.
  • curl.exe started by WinGUp, sending to temp[.]sh, and a single-letter .txt file such as a.txt.
  • DLL side-loading: BluetoothService.exe with log.dll.
  • Domains: skycloudcenter[.]com, self-dns[.]it[.]com, safe-dns[.]it[.]com, cdncheck[.]it[.]com.
  • IP addresses: 45.76.155[.]202, 45.77.31[.]210, 45.32.144[.]255, 61.4.102.97, 59.110.7.32.
  • Payload paths: 45.76.155[.]202/update/update.exe and 45.32.144[.]255/update/update.exe.
  • Sample SHA-256 values (Unit 42): 1f6d28370f4c2b13f3967b38f67f77eee7f5fba9e7743b6c66a8feb18ae8f33e and a3cf1c86731703043b3614e085b9c8c224d4125370f420ad031ad63c14d6c3ec.

How to check

Check the installed version and look for the files that the attack used. Change the path if Notepad++ sits in another folder.

(Get-Item "$env:ProgramFiles\Notepad++\notepad++.exe").VersionInfo.ProductVersion; Get-ChildItem $env:TEMP -Recurse -Include AutoUpdater.exe,log.dll,a.txt -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue

What to do now

  1. Install Notepad++ 8.9.1 or later. Download it by hand from the official site instead of using the old updater.
  2. Search machines and logs for the indicators above.
  3. If you find a hit, isolate the host. Reinstall it if a backdoor ran.
  4. Block the domains and IP addresses.

Frequently asked questions

Which Notepad++ versions received trojanized updates?

ThreatLocker lists 8.8.2 through 8.8.9. The sources differ on the exact first and last build.

Who was targeted?

Unit 42 reports targets mainly in Southeast Asia, in government, telecommunications and critical infrastructure.

Sources

  1. unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/notepad-infrastructure-compromise/
  2. threatlocker.com/blog/notepad-supply-chain-compromise-trojanized-updates-used-in-suspected-nation-state-attack

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