vendor binary

The M.E.Doc Update Supply Chain Attack

Updated 5 Oct 2026 · Incident date 14 Apr 2017

M.E.Doc shipped three sets of backdoored updates in 2017, starting with 10.01.175 and 10.01.176 on 14 April.

The backdoor sat in ZvitPublishedObjects.dll. The same update path delivered the NotPetya outbreak of 27 June 2017.

Major incident. Microsoft observed infections in Ukraine and another 64 countries. This entry covers the same outbreak as the other M.E.Doc record. Impact source

What happened

Attackers took over the update server and added a backdoor to a module that most Ukrainian companies trusted.

  • Talos reports that they used stolen M.E.Doc administrator credentials. They changed the NGINX configuration on upd.me-doc.com.ua and sent update traffic to a server they controlled.
  • According to ESET, the .NET module held a backdoor class named MeCom. The update checker method IsNewUpdate called it at each check.
  • The backdoor collected EDRPOU numbers, proxy settings and credentials, and email user names and passwords.
  • It had six commands, including shell commands, dropping and running files, and loading a DLL through rundll32.exe.
  • The backdoor hid its data in cookies on requests to the update server.

ESET notes that the 15 May 2017 set preceded the Filecoder.AESNI.C ransomware by three days. The 22 June set preceded NotPetya by five days. Police raided the vendor on 4 July 2017.

Affected versions

  • M.E.Doc 10.01.175 and 10.01.176, released 14 April 2017.
  • 10.01.180 and 10.01.181, released 15 May 2017.
  • 10.01.188 and 10.01.189, released 22 June 2017.
  • ESET states that updates between 17 May and 21 June 2017 were clean.

Indicators of compromise

  • Module: ZvitPublishedObjects.dll (about 5 MB, .NET) with a class named MeCom.
  • Registry: HKEY_CURRENT_USER\SOFTWARE\WC with the values Cred and Prx.
  • ESET detection name: MSIL/TeleDoor.A.
  • SHA-256 of bad DLL builds (Talos): f9d6fe8bd8aca6528dec7eaa9f1aafbecde15fd61668182f2ba8a7fc2b9a6740, d462966166450416d6addd3bfdf48590f8440dd80fc571a389023b7c860ca3ac.
  • SHA-1 values (ESET): 7B051E7E7A82F07873FA360958ACC6492E4385DD, 7F3B1C56C180369AE7891483675BEC61F3182F27, 3567434E2E49358E8210674641A20B147E0BD23C.
  • Addresses (Talos): 176.31.182[.]167 and 159.148.186[.]214. Update host: upd.me-doc.com.ua.

How to check

Check the registry key that the backdoor used, and hash the module. A WC key with Cred or Prx values shows that the backdoor ran.

Get-ItemProperty "HKCU:\SOFTWARE\WC" -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue; Get-ChildItem C:\ -Recurse -Filter ZvitPublishedObjects.dll -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue | Get-FileHash -Algorithm SHA256

What to do now

  1. Update M.E.Doc to a current release from the vendor.
  2. Change proxy and email passwords for all users of the software.
  3. Record the WC registry key for evidence, then delete it.
  4. Block the addresses above and review logs for outbound connections from the software.

Frequently asked questions

How old was the update server software?

BleepingComputer reports that Ukrainian officials say the server had not been updated since 2013. Researchers found a PHP web shell named medoc_online.php.

How often did the backdoor contact its servers?

Talos describes queries to command servers every two minutes.

Sources

  1. welivesecurity.com/2017/07/04/analysis-of-telebots-cunning-backdoor/
  2. blog.talosintelligence.com/the-medoc-connection/
  3. bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/m-e-doc-software-was-backdoored-3-times-servers-left-without-updates-since-2013/

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