vendor binary

The CyberLink Installer Supply Chain Attack

Updated 5 Oct 2026 · Incident date 20 Oct 2023

A CyberLink Promeo installer, signed by CyberLink, carried loader code that downloaded a fake PNG and ran it in memory in October 2023.

Microsoft linked CyberLink_Promeo_Downloader.exe to the North Korean group Diamond Sleet. It found the file on over 100 devices in Japan, Taiwan, Canada, and the United States.

What happened

Attackers put a trojanized copy of the installer on CyberLink's update servers. It had a valid CyberLink Corp. signature.

  • It stops if the date is outside a preset period or if it finds csfalconservice.exe, xagt.exe or taniumclient.exe.
  • Otherwise it connects to a remote server.
  • The server returns a file with a fake PNG header around an embedded payload.
  • The loader decrypts the payload and runs it in memory.

Microsoft first saw suspicious activity on 20 October 2023 and published its analysis on 22 November 2023.

Affected versions

  • File: CyberLink_Promeo_Downloader.exe. Microsoft gives no product version number.
  • SHA-256 of the trojanized installer: 166d1a6ddcde4e859a89c2c825cd3c8c953a86bfa92b343de7e5bfbfb5afb8be.
  • Signer: CyberLink Corp., SignerHash 8aa3877ab68ba56dabc2f2802e813dc36678aef4.
  • Paths on CyberLink servers: update.cyberlink.com/Retail/Promeo/RDZCMSFY1ELY/ and update.cyberlink.com/Retail/Patch/Promeo/DL/RDZCMSFY1ELY/.

Indicators of compromise

  • Encrypted PNG payload, SHA-256: 089573b3a1167f387dcdad5e014a5132e998b2c89bff29bcf8b06dd497d4e63d.
  • Decrypted second-stage PE, SHA-256: 915c2495e03ff7408f11a2a197f23344004c533ff87db4b807cc937f80c217a1.
  • Payload hosting: i.stack.imgur.com/NDTUM.png, www.webville.net/images/CL202966126.png, cldownloader.github.io/logo.png.
  • Command and control: mantis.jancom.pl/bluemantis/image/addon/addin.php and zeduzeventos.busqueabuse.com/wp-admin/js/widgets/sub/wids.php.
  • Static User-Agent: Microsoft Internet Explorer.
  • Defender Antivirus names: Trojan:Win32/LambLoad.A!dha, .B!dha, .C!dha, Trojan:Win64/LambLoad.D!dha, .E!dha.
  • Defender for Endpoint alerts: Diamond Sleet activity group, and An executable loaded an unexpected dll.

How to check

Compare the SHA-256 of the installer with the hash above. If it matches, treat the machine as compromised.

Get-FileHash .\CyberLink_Promeo_Downloader.exe -Algorithm SHA256

A valid signature does not prove the file is clean. The bad file shows CyberLink Corp. as the signer.

Get-AuthenticodeSignature .\CyberLink_Promeo_Downloader.exe | Format-List

What to do now

  1. Hash every copy of CyberLink_Promeo_Downloader.exe on your fleet and compare it with the SHA-256 above.
  2. Isolate any machine that ran the bad file.
  3. Reset credentials and tokens that were on that machine.
  4. Check proxy and DNS logs for the hosts in the indicator list.

Frequently asked questions

What was the CyberLink supply chain attack?

Attackers put a modified Promeo installer on CyberLink's update servers. Microsoft linked it to Diamond Sleet.

How does the modified CyberLink installer work?

It checks the date and the running security products. Then it downloads a fake PNG, decrypts the payload and runs it in memory.

Sources

  1. microsoft.com/en-us/security/blog/2023/11/22/diamond-sleet-supply-chain-compromise-distributes-a-modified-cyberlink-installer/
  2. bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/microsoft-lazarus-hackers-breach-cyberlink-in-supply-chain-attack/

Send this page to the person who looks after AI at your company.

Email it

More supply chain attacks

All 172 attacks in the library · What is a supply chain attack? · How to prevent supply chain attacks

Check the next update before you install it

Vigilance compares the version you trust with the new one. It names the one file that gained a power the old version did not have.

Start the free 14-day trialBrowse the attack library