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The ASUS Live Update Supply Chain Attack

Updated 18 Nov 2026 · Incident date 1 Jun 2018

ASUS Live Update builds from June to November 2018 shipped trojanized and signed, and downloaded extra software onto chosen machines.

ASUS Live Update versions below 3.6.8 are affected by Operation ShadowHammer. Only machines with a MAC address on a hardcoded list got the second-stage malware.

What happened

Attackers placed a backdoor in the ASUS Live Update utility and sent it through the real ASUS update servers.

  • They added their code to an old ASUS binary and signed it with two real ASUS certificates.
  • The modified Setup.exe contains obfuscated shellcode.
  • The code hashes the MAC addresses of the local network adapters and compares them with a built-in table.
  • If one hash matches, it downloads a second payload. If none match, it does nothing.
  • Kaspersky extracted more than 600 unique MAC addresses from over 200 samples.

The builds went out from June to November 2018. Kaspersky found the attack in January 2019 and published it on 23 April 2019.

Affected versions

  • ASUS Live Update versions below 3.6.8, per the CERT-EU advisory.
  • Huntress lists the trojanized builds as 3.5.9, 3.6.0, 3.6.2 and 3.6.5.
  • ASUS released the fixed Live Update 3.6.8 on 26 March 2019.

Indicators of compromise

  • A file named idx.ini. The shellcode writes it up to two directory levels above the place where Setup.exe ran.
  • The domain asushotfix[.]com, with the paths /logo.jpg and /logo2.jpg.
  • Second-stage servers listed by Securelist: 103.19.3[.]17, 103.19.3[.]43, 103.19.3[.]44, 117.16.142[.]9, 23.236.77[.]175 and 23.236.77[.]177.
  • A Setup.exe sample with MD5 0f49621b06f2cdaac8850c6e9581a594, 63f2fe96de336b6097806b22b5ab941a or 17a36ac3e31f3a18936552aff2c80249. These are a small part of the full Securelist list.
  • Code signed as ASUSTeK Computer Inc. with certificate serial 0ff067d801f7daeeae842e9fe5f610ea or 05e6a0be5ac359c7ff11f4b467ab20fc.

How to check

Search the disk for the idx.ini marker file. On Windows, run this in a Command Prompt.

where /r C:\ idx.ini

Read the Live Update version in the Windows installed apps list. ASUS released version 3.6.8 to address the issue.

What to do now

  1. Update ASUS Live Update to 3.6.8 or later.
  2. Search for idx.ini and for traffic to asushotfix.com in your logs.
  3. Run the ASUS or Kaspersky diagnostic tool on each ASUS machine. It compares your MAC addresses with the target list.
  4. If a machine is on the target list or has idx.ini, treat it as compromised. Rebuild it and rotate the credentials that it held.

Frequently asked questions

How many machines got the backdoored update?

Kaspersky saw the injected code on more than 57,000 of its own users' machines. Huntress puts the number at about one million.

Was the file signed?

Yes. The samples carry two real ASUS certificates from the DigiCert SHA2 Assured ID Code Signing CA, and they have no signing timestamp.

Where did the malicious files sit?

Huntress notes that four malicious ZIP files were hosted on the ASUS servers.

Sources

  1. securelist.com/operation-shadowhammer-a-high-profile-supply-chain-attack/90380/
  2. web.archive.org/web/20261015141118/https://www.huntress.com/blog/faq-asus-liveupdate-attack-operation-shadowhammer-9fc9c03b2da9
  3. cert.europa.eu/publications/security-advisories/2019-007/

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