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The 3CX DesktopApp Supply Chain Attack

Updated 5 Oct 2026 · Incident date 13 Mar 2023

3CX DesktopApp 18.12.407 and 18.12.416 for Windows carried a trojanized library that fetched and ran hidden instructions in March 2023.

The attack became public on 29 March 2023 and has the id CVE-2023-29059. Four macOS builds were also affected.

Major incident. Mandiant traced the 3CX intrusion to a compromised X_TRADER installer. Attackers then compromised the 3CX software build environment. Impact source

What happened

Signed 3CX installers carried a bad ffmpeg.dll on Windows.

  • The MSI installer starts 3CXDesktopApp.exe, which loads the bad DLL.
  • The DLL decrypts a blob inside d3dcompiler_47.dll with RC4.
  • The code downloads icon files from a GitHub repository.
  • It reads a command server address from each icon file.
  • It fetches a second-stage payload from that server.

The macOS build used libffmpeg.dylib with 16 command server addresses built in. The first icon files appeared on GitHub on 7 December 2022.

Affected versions

  • Windows: 3CXDesktopApp 18.12.407 and 18.12.416 (MSI installers).
  • macOS: 18.11.1213, 18.12.402, 18.12.407 and 18.12.416 (DMG installers).
  • Fortinet names 18.12.422 for Windows as a fixed build.

Indicators of compromise

  • ffmpeg.dll SHA-256: 7986bbaee8940da11ce089383521ab420c443ab7b15ed42aed91fd31ce833896.
  • d3dcompiler_47.dll SHA-256: 11be1803e2e307b647a8a7e02d128335c448ff741bf06bf52b332e0bbf423b03.
  • Windows installer SHA-256: aa124a4b4df12b34e74ee7f6c683b2ebec4ce9a8edcf9be345823b4fdcf5d868.
  • macOS libffmpeg.dylib SHA-1: 769383fc65d1386dd141c960c9970114547da0c2.
  • macOS DMG 18.12.416 SHA-1: 3dc840d32ce86cebf657b17cef62814646ba8e98.
  • macOS files in the app folder: UpdateAgent, .session-lock and .main-storage.
  • Command domains include glcloudservice.com, akamaitechcloudservices.com, azureonlinestorage.com, msedgepackageinfo.com and officestoragebox.com. Unit 42 lists 15 in all.
  • The 3CX app downloads icon1.ico to icon15.ico from GitHub.

How to check

On Windows PowerShell, hash the DLL and compare it with the SHA-256 value above.

Get-ChildItem -Path "$env:LOCALAPPDATA\Programs\3CXDesktopApp","C:\Program Files\3CXDesktopApp" -Recurse -Filter ffmpeg.dll -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue | Get-FileHash -Algorithm SHA256

On macOS, look for the extra files in the app folder.

ls -la /Applications/3CX\ Desktop\ App.app/Contents/MacOS | grep -E "UpdateAgent|\.main-storage|\.session-lock"

What to do now

  1. Uninstall the affected version and install the latest 3CX build.
  2. Search your endpoints and DNS logs for the hashes and domains above.
  3. If you find a match, isolate the host and treat it as compromised.
  4. Rotate credentials that were stored on or reachable from that host.

Frequently asked questions

Who did the 3CX attack?

CrowdStrike attributed the activity to the group it calls Labyrinth Chollima, according to Unit 42.

How many systems ran 3CX?

Unit 42 found 247,277 distinct IP addresses in 199 countries that ran 3CX applications.

Sources

  1. unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/3cxdesktopapp-supply-chain-attack/
  2. fortinet.com/blog/threat-research/3cx-desktop-app-compromised
  3. objective-see.org/blog/blog_0x73.html

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